A History of the Mafia, by Dan Clarke
To try and explain how the mafia has survived for so long and become a phenomenon in twentieth century Italy is complex, involving the much-debated origins of the mafia as an organisation. Why was it Sicily that was seen as the cause of all the criminal disturbances? Did a government; trying to shift the social, economic, political and corruption problems that occurred create the mafia? Fascism proved difficult to implant in the South so, arguably, the notion of the mafia could be used to explain this. Or was it simply the criminal element becoming organised out of pure distrust of the state?
This study will try to highlight the reasons why the mafia is such a phenomenon in Italy with such factors to consider as: the influence of entertainment; clientelism; development and growth of industries; past history, including feudalism and the clash of North and South differences.
To try and explain the mafia, one has to study the past history of Sicily and the connections to the mainland. The concept of the mafia in Italy has been used as Christopher Duggan (1989) explains, "a general synonym for criminals." The early government reports found the definition of mafia elusive although they agreed that it "was not a criminal association but the development and perfecting of assertiveness for evil intent of people, who derive their livelihood from violence, deceit and intimidation." Discussion about who the mafia were was very limited but it was agreed that they were the ones responsible for all the crime.
But before 1860, the words mafia and mafioso were not connected to crime or violence. As the Sicilian ethnographer, Giuseppe Pitre (1889) wrote, "the word mafia and its derivatives, meant, and still means, beauty, gracefulness, perfection, and general excellence." As Duggan states, "Pitre was a fervent Sicilian patriot. He was eager to correct the severe abuse to which he felt the term [mafia] had been subjected since 1860." This may have led to exaggeration on Pitres part but nevertheless mafia was to be gradually associated with the criminal element of society.
Entertainment was an important factor in promoting sinister overtones linked to mafia. A comedy play by Giuseppe Rizzotto and Gaspore Mosca, called 'I Mafiusi di la Vicaria', proved to be very popular and as Duggan notes, "in the quarter century that followed the first production, there were two thousand performances in Italy." The play was set in the main Palermo prison, the criminals, Duggan explains, "spoke in colourful jargon, played cards, duelled with knives, and observed a rudimentary hierarchy." This ritualistic criminal organisation was to be connected with ideals of real secret criminal societies, which as appendix A clearly shows, had similar descriptions of rituals, ceremonies and the like to those portrayed in Rizzotto's play.
Many people, including the police, mistakenly took for granted that there was a criminal organisation in Italy called the mafia with rituals, uniforms and various initiations. The play popularised the idea that Mafiosi were common criminals, however there were other, arguably more influential, factors to be considered.
The Neapolitan Camorra was considered to be a sinister criminal organisation in Naples. It was over-imaginatively written about in the early 1860s and was to be compared to crime in Sicily. In fact, as Duggan points out, " the Encyclopaedia Britannica of 1911 claimed that the mafia was a secret society whose 'organisation and purpose much resemble those of the Camorra'." This comparison with the Camorra almost certainly influenced people about the existence of a similar criminal entity in Sicily.
Further influences on the concept of the mafia are to be found in the problems faced by the new Italian state post 1860. Long before Sicily was unified with the mainland, it had become increasingly more of an economic backwater being cut off from Africa and drawn into the orbit of European civilisation by a succession of neglecting rulers like Germany, France and Spain.
The island was turned into an outlying province of influences of the Renaissance and the Reformation, and the discovery of the America's in the sixteenth century dealt a further blow. Sicily was left on the fringes of the capitalist world and was not to be affected by technological changes being introduced in France and Great Britain. Duggan (1997) explains that, "insufficient effect was made by Sicily's rulers up to and including the eighteenth century for social and economic reforms." This argues that the state was inadequate when it came to bringing the Sicilians into their policies. Anton Blok's (1974) opinion is similar. "During the long centuries of foreign rule", Blok argues, "no government ever effectively penetrated this hinterland. The outside authorities relied on the landowning barons who dominated local government."
The element of feudalism gave the barons power to govern the island themselves, so even when rulers like the Bourbons (1734-1860) tried to impose control, the barons refused to co-operate. Along with the nobles there were the 'gabelloti', the middle class sector that exploited farming. It was the peasants who were vulnerable to exploitation and thus suffered in a repressive state.
When feudalism was abolished in 1812, "baronical jurisdiction," Blok writes, "remained in force. Noble landlords maintained private armies of field guards to keep peasants in submission." The demand for protection was a reason for growth of organised 'henchmen' who helped to control any peasant uprisings. The 'supposed' end of feudalism and the introduction of private property rights led to protection becoming a type of industry.
As Diego Gambetta (1996) explains, "a persistent lack of trust fuelled by the dying embers of feudalism and combined with the rise of a sinister breed of protectors from the ashes of the ancien regime," could partially explain the beginnings of the mafia as an organised crime syndicate.
When Garibaldi unified Sicily in 1860, peasants supported him in the hope of land and lower taxes, and the middle class supported him for the hope of more power. However the island was made a subject to the alien constitution and laws of Piedmont. There was tax; military conscription was introduced (and immediately disliked) and Garibaldi's land reform promises were dropped. The state found itself isolated by the people and their ideas of private justice (mafia theory style), thus as Duggan points out, "there were signs that the gap between people and the state was growing."
There was a general hostility to Italy, which was due, in part, to ignorance of the North and a mistrust of the Sicilians due partially to the history of feudalism and the barons. More than often the government would respond violently to any disagreements. The northern officials who arrived in Sicily after 1860 found a region whose culture and economy were markedly different from those to which they were accustomed. The Sicilians were accused of being lazy, self-centred and corrupt, seen sometimes as literally backwards. "By the mid-1860s," Duggan (1997) explains, "almost one hundred thousand troops were engaged in what the government rather speciously referred to as a 'war against brigands.'" However the concept of the mafia seemed to be promoted by the government, as Duggan sums up, "in reality, the unrest and lawlessness in the South were as much the result of political and social protest as of crime." The notion of the mafia helped in this case to popularise crime as organised and exploiting the state and Sicily itself.
The problems of integrating Sicily along with social, economic and political problems were blamed solely on the mafia. The government thought that if the idea of a much larger criminal element was apparent then they could be forgiven for much of their mistakes. As Duggan describes, "the prefect of Palermo, Count Filippo Gualterio, in 1865, first spoke of the organised criminals known as the mafia." This is the first official reference and Gualterio criminalized political problems foremost by associating the mafia with them.
This idea of politics and crime was to be used at a faster rate as the concept of the mafia was seen as a powerful instrument for dealing with political unrest. Therefore as Duggan simplifies, "those with power in Sicily could be loosely connected with the mafia and conveniently be charged with criminal association." This resulted in the mafia drawing attention away from the social and economic causes of unrest and also offered justification for repressive measures used by the state and for any dissent to be blamed on the mafia.
It can be argued that criminals wanting power adopted the mafia notion.
In 1876, Mafia Don Rafael Palizzolo ran for political office in Sicily. He forced the voters to vote for him under gunpoint. After being elected into office, he promoted Mafia Don Crispi as Prime Minister and funnelled government funds into the society known as the Mafia.
This shows that corruption occurred early in the government. The lack of pro-government deputies in Sicily was also blamed on association with the mafia; this led to official reports on the mafia becoming inconclusive and bewildering to read.
Because Sicily had failed to endorse 'the values of the state', the North saw Sicily as beyond redemption and used the mafia as an easy excuse for failure. This resulted in Sicilians seeing in every misfortune the influence of northern prejudice. This idea of an organised criminal network appealed to many to turn to crime. As Duggan writes, "in the absence of legal channels of wealth, violence will retain much of its mystique, and those that practice it are likely to exploit existing myths."
The police furthered this incentive for crime, as they seemed unequipped to cope with the growth and spread of criminal activities. This is due to, according to Duggan, "poor co-ordination and a low percentage of Sicilians in the police force due to low wages." The police tended to be partially linked to crime because of their past history as security forces under the Bourbon government, organising robberies and other crime. The bourgeoisie were also blamed for using the mafia to intimidate voters in elections as well
The Sicilians became very patriotic and as Duggan notes, preferred "blood for blood" , a personal retribution, instead of involving the police. 'Omerta' was developed, meaning non-cooperation with the authorities. Which as Blok states, "makes both delinquency and mafia difficult to control."
The growth of the mafia has been in the western and central areas as appendix B clearly shows. Gambetta explains that the mafia evolved in areas marked by:
(1) Economic conflict over the management and appropriation of land and related resources; (2) mobile wealth and numerous transactions, as in urban markets; and (3) political conflict among local factions especially in connection with the institutional changes effected by the Italian state between 1869 and 1890.
This suggests that the mafia grew as an excuse of politically poor governments and as a result in more criminal prospects because of bad state control.
The lack of stable government seemed to continue with Mussolini and fascism. As Duggan points out,
Their [Sicilians] loyalty to fascism had been eroded by years of neglect, the ravages of war, and such extraordinary insensitive gestures as Mussolini's decision in 1941 to transfer all Sicilian-born officials to the mainland - a clear sign of his lack of faith in the islanders.
The mafia has been viewed as the reason why fascism was not that effective and was an organisation that debatably provided order and justice when the state failed. The author of an article in 'La Regione' (January 1922) explained, "Two identical institutions cannot coexist in the same place. On the mainland, socialism had been suppressed by fascism; in Sicily the mafia had fulfilled the same function." Fascism wanted to help Sicily's social and moral development according to the principals of the regime. This led to a focus of attention on the mafia.
Cesare Mori, a nationalistic, devoted military man, was promoted to prefect of Palermo in 1925 to battle the mafia dilemma. Mori began the campaign strongly with the 'Siege of Gangi'. "The police were told to enter the houses of wanted men and sleep in their beds, kill their cattle and take hostages (usually family members)." Many bandits were arrested, one hundred and thirty latitani (men on the run) and three hundred accomplices, mostly relatives.
The operation was not run very well as Duggan explains, "despite the embarrassingly slow results and questionable methods being used at Gangi, ignorance and expediency combined to produce a more comfortable myth." Every 'success' that Mori had was claimed to be at the expense of the mafia. It was used to enhance the reputation of Mori and fascism however poor the evidence was which arguably led to people being wrongly accused.
The priority on how Mori and fascism was perceived combined with Mori's determination to win resulted in many bandits making a clean getaway. The notion of the mafia was, questionably, used by Mori to gain a good reputation. Mori also used the theme of the mafia to dispatch political rivals, like Alfredo Cucco who stood little chance against the accusations of criminal association.
Post war Italy saw the mafia figures in key positions in land reclamation consortiums and land reform agencies, after 1950, under the leader ship of the Christian Democrats Party. Patrick McCarthy (2000) explains,
Close ties between the mafia and the majority political party triggered what is probably a unique phenomenon in the centuries-old relations between organised crime and a national state: the total suspension of any attention or alarm on the part of the authorities.
This was a crucial period for the Christian Democrats to lay down an influence. Connections with the mafia were to lead to bribery and corruption, which eventually resulted in the disablement of the Christian Democrats in January 1994.
Whilst in power the Christian Democrats, together with mafia connections used clientelism to their own advantage in terms of resources. Amalia Signorelli defines clientelism as, "a system of interpersonal relations within which privates ties of a kinship, ritual kinship or friendship dimension are employed in public structures so as to use public resources for private advantage."
This resulted in resources available to the Party at a local level, for resources to be spread out to leaders and activists and for contracts going over to mafia connections. Clientelism built up a network of favours (clientale) that is arguably similar to the popular theory of the mafia.
Throughout the years 1968-73, Sicily underwent change under the impact of emigration and economic development. The rural interior suffered from depopulation and demonstrations were repressed due to poor trade unions. Some agro-towns and villages declined irreversibly and the class structure became more stratified. "Small proprietors," Paul Ginsborg (1990) notes, "traders, public officials and the professional classes all became more numerous."
Agriculture offered unstable employment and development in coastal areas and major cities causing chaos. The building trade flourished but the "unemployed or underemployed remained on the fringes of the labour market, exposed to the inducements and publicity of a consumer society, but," as Ginsborg explains, "without the material means to satisfy many of their basic needs." It was in these extreme situations, when the people were desperate to earn any kind of living, when for Ginsborg the "Mafia in
Sicily increased their network of influence and protection."
If the traditional mafia has debatable origins, then it can be argued that a 'new' mafia was born through the city, which offered new opportunities for profit. Pino Arlacchi's (1983) theory explained, "The 'old' mafia, characterised by its honour and its notables, was dead; a 'new' mafia, enterprising, blood-thirsty and drug-dealing was about to be born." This is possibly due to the mafia adapting well to modernity and prospering outside of Sicily, most notoriously in America as appendix C shows.
For Duggan the complexity of the mafia origins are due to the popularity of Rizzotto's play, a comparison to the Camorra and governments blaming their inadequacy and corruptness on crime. Blok agrees that the past history of feudalism and protection had an adverse effect on Sicilians to trust authority figures. The development of Sicily, according to Ginsborg, helped the mafia to increase power and offered good prospects as McCarthy states.
Arguably, the way in which adaptation to modernity combined with the effectiveness of clientelism helped crime into politics. With recent revelations about political corruption still shadowing Italy, further questions must be considered. Who contributed to the discourse about the South and why? And how can a government with a history of corruption and distrust both externally and internally hope to repel the criminal element?
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